Excerpts from FBI Agent Scott Wenther's 42-page affidavit in U.S. v. Reginald Rice, which a federal judge called "misleading" and ruled the resulting wiretap to be "illegal." CS = Confidential Source. ---- In sum, they are as follows: All normal avenues of investigation have been carefully evaluated for use or have been attempted with minimal results. The traditional investigative techniques utilized thus far have included the use of confidential sources (against known members of the Shawn Bullitt organization), obtaining toll records for other phone lines and for the [Primary Rice Phone], and physical surveillance. Also closely considered, but not deemed likely to succeed for reasons set forth below, include the use of undercover agents, use of a Federal Grand Jury, the serving of search warrants, interviews of subjects or associates, and the use of "trashh pulls." It appears from the information received from the CS, as well as my own experience, that Reginald Rice is unlikely to discuss the full extent of his organization's activities or membership. The CS utilized in the investigation of the Shawn Bullitt organization was unable to meet directly with others associated with Bullitt, including Reginald Rice. In my experience, it is unlikely that the CS will be able to conduct drug transactions directly with all identified members of this organization. Even if this did occur, these members would be unlikely to reveal their current source(s) of supply for the cocaine, the precise smuggling routes used by the individuals responsible for transporting the cocaine to Kentucky, identity of the couriers, the identities of the ultimate purchasers of the narcotics, the locations where the drugs and drug proceeds are stored or the precise manner in which he launders his drug proceeds. This type of information, which the United States is seeking in this investigation, is guarded and is only supplied to people with a need to know, in order to protect the shipments of cocaine and drug proceeds from seizure by the authorities, from theft by other drug traffickers, and to guarantee that Rice's position of power in the organization will not be supplanted by a competitor. As a result, CS has not been made aware of the organization's entire membership and activities. With the limited information developed to date by sources, and without evidence obtained from court authorized intercepts, the objectives of this investigation cannot be more fully developed. As referenced previously, CS has not been able to purchase controlled substances from Reginald Rice. The CS is not closely associated with Reginald Rice and is therefore not in a position to attempt the purchase of controlled substances. No other confidential source has been identified in this investigation that would be in a position to attempt the purchase of controlled substances from Reginald Rice. CS has stated that he/she has limited ability to introduce unfamiliar individuals to Rice or his co-conspirators. Additionally, based on my knowledge and experience in investigating drug trafficking organizations, I have learned that these organizations go to great lengths to compartmentalize their operations. This is done in an effort to construct as many layers of insulation as possible between each component of the organization thus preventing the penetration of the organization and threatening its operational integrity. The use of the undercover agents is not expected to obtain the evidence necessary to charge all of the participants included in this conspiracy. The undercover agents will not likely be exposed to all subjects of this investigation in order to effectively and sufficiently obtain admissible evidence needed to prosecute the offenses under investigation. Although a pen register and trap and trace has been obtained and used, this has not achieved all of the goals of the investigation. These records provide only circumstantial evidence that the telephone to be monitored was used to make or receive calls to and from other telephones. These records do not identify those individuals actually making and receiving telephonic communications to or from the target telephone as does the interception of wire communications. Nor do these records provide the content of the calls occurring on the target telephone. As demonstrated in previous paragraphs, the pattern of telephone use by Rice shows repeated calls to telephone numbers subscribed to by known individuals with histories of drug-related arrests. While this information is useful, it does not indicate current criminal involvement (if any) or even definitively establish the existence of criminal conspiracy. Indeed, I believe that only through the interception of wire communications can the full scope of this conspiracy be discovered, and direct evidence for successful prosecution of all the subjects and assets involved be obtained. Physical investigation of the subjects of this investigation has been conducted and is presently being conducted with only limited success. Physical surveillance has identified locations and vehicles utilized by members of this organization. Physical surveillance has also corroborated information provided by the CS. Physical surveillance has shown [sic] to have its limitations. The source(s) of cocaine supply outside Kentucky and other Kentucky-based distributors of this organization have not been identified thus limiting the number of targets who could be the subject of surveillance. The law enforcement agents who have investigated this organization are not in a position to learn the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other identifying information of cocaine distributors outside those already detailed above. As a result, law enforcement is severely limited in its ability to identify the additional key members of this organization, including but not limited to the transporters, suppliers, and other distributors. Moreover, surveillance in and of itself, even if highly successful, rarely succeeds in gathering sufficient evidence of the criminal activities under investigation. Surveillance is an investigative technique that is used to confirm meetings between alleged conspirators, but agents watching meetings cannot determine the purpose of the meeting or hear what the targets discuss. When used in connection with electronic surveillance, physical surveillance takes on new significance if the activities observed relate to intercepted conversations. For example, if a conversation about an upcoming narcotics transaction is intercepted, physical surveillance can be planned to observe the transaction. The risk of conducting long-term physical surveillance in this investigation is two-fold. As previously outlined, this organization utilizes violence and/or the threat of violence as intimidation to further their drug trafficking activities. Members of this criminal organization with known violent histories routinely carry firearms and wear bullet-resistant vests, which poses an unreasonable danger to law enforcement personnel attempting to conduct physical surveillance. Additionally, based on my knowledge and experience in investigating drug trafficking organizations, I have learned that these organizations employ countersurveillance to detect law enforcement operations. Such detection would severely hamper investigative efforts. Based on my knowledge and experience in investigating drug trafficking organizations, I have learned that members of these criminal organizations often utilize vehicles, telephones, and other property licensed out of and registered to others in an attempt to insulate themselves from the criminal activities they are involved in. Even if highly successful, tracking the movements of suspected drug traffickers alone will not establish their involvement in criminal activity.